New PDF release: Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

By Nicola Friederike Maaser

ISBN-10: 3642041523

ISBN-13: 9783642041525

Political and monetary associations are usually ruled by way of committees that face the problem to reconcile the personal tastes in their individuals. How may still selection ideas be designed to generate reasonable and sustainable agreements, for instance if committee individuals signify teams of alternative sizes? This publication makes use of game-theoretic innovations and versions to handle the problem of political decision-making procedures. as well as supplying a survey on easy game-theoretic instruments within the research of political judgements, the writer seems to be at particular concerns similar to two-tiered vote casting platforms or the effect of lobbyists on legislative committees, and exhibits how the types might be utilized to real-world contexts corresponding to the european decision-making institutions.

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Example text

Their work is considered in Sect. 2. Finally, Sect. 3 provides a brief survey of attempts to measure power in spatial voting games. 1 Power Indices In this section we consider voting power in the context of a committee which can be represented by a weighted majority game or a more general simple game. A simple example serves to introduce some key concepts. 1. Suppose a three-player take-it-or-leave-it committee Œ3I 2; 1; 1 is presented with a proposal that it can adopt or reject. In the latter case, the status quo Q prevails.

In case that players i 2 Sk do not unanimously agree on the formation of Sk , those who have selected the strategy j D Sk remain singletons. Moving on to the NTU-game, the information about the coalition formation process is lost, but the ‘equal division of payoffs’ rule survives. 3 summarizes the attainable efficient payoff vectors. S / D 0 otherwise. According to this representation, the payoff 1 can be divided among the members of a winning coalition in any way possible. 3 Spatial Analysis In political applications, the set of feasible alternatives from which the committee can choose is often adequately described by a (usually nonempty, compact, and convex) subset X of a one- or many-dimensional Euclidean space Rm : the choice of tax-rates, expenditure levels, or a minimum wage are examples for approximately continuous variables.

D u2 1=3 1=4 1=5 Sk if and only if fj g otherwise. 5) states that a particular coalition Sk will come into being if and only if all its prospective members choose Sk . In case that players i 2 Sk do not unanimously agree on the formation of Sk , those who have selected the strategy j D Sk remain singletons. Moving on to the NTU-game, the information about the coalition formation process is lost, but the ‘equal division of payoffs’ rule survives. 3 summarizes the attainable efficient payoff vectors.

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Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis by Nicola Friederike Maaser


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