By Christina Jonung, Inga Persson
Monetary research of the relatives is a up to date, yet already good verified region in economics. This e-book bears proof to the full of life and correct study within the region. Essays during this finished assortment supply a transparent photograph of the cutting-edge of economics of the kinfolk and discover theoretical and empirical functions. The members extra examine tax, public baby care and parental depart guidelines by way of the incentives they bring for labour provide, time allocation, human capital accumulation and the alternative of ways to arrange baby care. This quantity additionally attracts on event from the Nordic international locations, popular for his or her adventure with family members and gender equality guidelines.
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Extra resources for Economics of the Family and Family Policies
Part I WHERE ARE WE IN THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY? Pollak INTRODUCTION In the 1970s, a proposed change in social welfare policy in the United Kingdom excited considerable debate. The universal child allowance, which had consisted primarily of a reduction in the amount withheld for taxes from the father’s paycheck, was to be replaced by a cash payment to the mother. An excerpt from the parliamentary debate in Hansard (House of Commons, May 13, 1975) expresses a popular sentiment: [F]ar from a new deal for families, it will take money out of the husband’s pocket on the Friday and put it into the wife’s purse on the following Tuesday.
Pareto-optimal outcomes are possible in non-cooperative games, but not necessary. Without binding agreements, much of the motivation for assuming Pareto-optimality vanishes. It is possible, however, for non-cooperative bargaining to yield Pareto-optimal outcomes under certain conditions. 13 In general, repeated non-cooperative games have multiple equilibria, and Pareto-optimal equilibria can often be sustained by the threat of punishment. In essence, each spouse realizes that the one-period gain from deviating from an agreement will be less than the loss associated with being punished by their spouse in the periods that follow.
This non-cooperative marriage may be better for both spouses than divorce. Divorce, the argument goes, may be the ultimate threat available to marital partners in disagreement, but a non-cooperative marriage in which the spouses receive some benefits due to joint consumption of public goods may be a more plausible threat in day-today marital bargaining. The introduction of this internal threat point has important implications, because separate spheres bargaining generates family demands that, under some circumstances, depend not on who receives income after divorce, but on who receives (or controls) income within the marriage.
Economics of the Family and Family Policies by Christina Jonung, Inga Persson