By T. Parthasarathy, T.E.S. Raghavan
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Extra resources for Some Topics in Two-person Games
Their work is considered in Sect. 2. Finally, Sect. 3 provides a brief survey of attempts to measure power in spatial voting games. 1 Power Indices In this section we consider voting power in the context of a committee which can be represented by a weighted majority game or a more general simple game. A simple example serves to introduce some key concepts. 1. Suppose a three-player take-it-or-leave-it committee Œ3I 2; 1; 1 is presented with a proposal that it can adopt or reject. In the latter case, the status quo Q prevails.
In case that players i 2 Sk do not unanimously agree on the formation of Sk , those who have selected the strategy j D Sk remain singletons. Moving on to the NTU-game, the information about the coalition formation process is lost, but the ‘equal division of payoffs’ rule survives. 3 summarizes the attainable efficient payoff vectors. S / D 0 otherwise. According to this representation, the payoff 1 can be divided among the members of a winning coalition in any way possible. 3 Spatial Analysis In political applications, the set of feasible alternatives from which the committee can choose is often adequately described by a (usually nonempty, compact, and convex) subset X of a one- or many-dimensional Euclidean space Rm : the choice of tax-rates, expenditure levels, or a minimum wage are examples for approximately continuous variables.
D u2 1=3 1=4 1=5 Sk if and only if fj g otherwise. 5) states that a particular coalition Sk will come into being if and only if all its prospective members choose Sk . In case that players i 2 Sk do not unanimously agree on the formation of Sk , those who have selected the strategy j D Sk remain singletons. Moving on to the NTU-game, the information about the coalition formation process is lost, but the ‘equal division of payoffs’ rule survives. 3 summarizes the attainable efficient payoff vectors.
Some Topics in Two-person Games by T. Parthasarathy, T.E.S. Raghavan