Download e-book for kindle: State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions by Alex Talbot Coram (auth.)

By Alex Talbot Coram (auth.)

ISBN-10: 1349418293

ISBN-13: 9781349418299

ISBN-10: 1403900833

ISBN-13: 9781403900838

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Extra resources for State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions

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To see this outcome as paradoxical is to miss the point made previously that intuitive understandings of what is optimal for each individual player may often be wrong. It simply illustrates the point made in Chapter 1 that the equilibrium strategies for individuals may not be on the Pareto frontier. 5 Pay-offs depend on contributions The analysis of security games can be extended by returning to the one shot simultaneous moves case. Consider the possibility that individuals attempt to provide security through some voluntary agreement to contribute towards the costs of order.

Let the probability that the opponent is a tit-for-tat player be p; p P ‰0; 1Š F F F. 3 Pay-offs with tit-for-tat and defecting players p‰a=…1 À †Š ‡ …1 À p†b ! pc; which requires p ! ii) has some interesting features. Observe that it requires a ! c…1 À † for p 1. By de®nition c > a. This means that the value of  cannot be too small. As noted, the usual assumption in the Hobbesian game is that domination is the best outcome and being dominated is the worst. For example, let c ˆ 2; a ˆ 1 and b ˆ À3 and the probability that the other player is tit-for-tat be 12.

Security in the Hobbesian State 29 Remark [iii]: It is sometimes suggested that players would evolve norms of cooperation or some other pattern of behaviour in order to avoid such a sub-optimal outcome (Ullman-Margalit, 1977). This may be true in some cases. What must be stressed, however, is that the notion of players having a change of heart and developing the right sort of values is, in no sense, a solution to the prisoner's dilemma. If the norms are so altered that a player prefers, say, co-operation with a high probability of being dead to non-co-operation, the game is no longer a prisoner's dilemma.

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State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions by Alex Talbot Coram (auth.)

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